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Should international institutions promote international regulatory 
harmonisation? This paper will present arguments, looking at the UN 
Convention Against Corruption, noting that international institution regulation 
may play less of a harmonising role that it ostensibly appears to. Section I 
discusses the underlying motivations for harmonisation, presenting three views 
of regulation based on the likely effects of “globalisation” and noting most views 
support global harmonisation. Section II will discuss specifically the UN 
Corruption Convention and compare the Convention (which aims at global 
harmonising of certain practices against corruption) against its ideals and an 
optimal regulation. Section III will discuss the influence of regulatory “clubs” 
(such as the OECD or OAS Corruption Conventions) and show how regional 
harmonisation may be superior to global harmonisation in terms of reaching an 
ideal and optimum. Section III will address how global harmonisation may be 
deleterious to national interests and will discuss how such global harmonisation 
may be “domesticated” in the nations’ laws and moeurs. Because business 
practices depend on a wide range of influences in the national business system, 
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Much casual observation suggests that 
international organisations play an important 
role in the harmonisation of business practices 
around the globe.
1 The OECD has established 
“guidelines” for its members in the regulation of 
multi-lateral enterprises as well as for its 
members’ domestic regulation through a 
number of committees – including its Public 
Management Programme (PUMA). The OECD 
has also established a Convention on the 
Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, an important 
example the seemingly successful international regulation.
2 Such casual observation is 
bolstered by data suggesting that international organisations have increased their 
influence in the regulation of national business. Looking at figure 1, national 
membership in international organisations has increased (with Japan representing the 
largest percentage increase).
 3  The nature of this regulation may be under dispute as 
some commentators such as Rodrik (1999) note that the activities of these 
organisations would appear to be a type of supra-national regulation while other 
commentators such as Jacobs (2002) would argue for a nuanced view of 
harmonisation, noting that the activities of these institutions fit into a “multi-layered 
governance.”
 Yet, these data ostensibly support he view that international institutions 
play a role in harmonising business practices around the globe. 
 
Yet, international institutional regulation’s effects on harmonisation is more 
complex than such mono-causality suggests. Regulation is often ambiguous or 
regulates different areas from those supposedly covered under the treaty or 
Convention. This paper will present arguments, looking at the UN Convention 
Against Corruption, noting that international institution regulation may play less of a 
harmonising role that it ostensibly appears to. Section I will discuss the underlying 
motivations for harmonisation, presenting three views of regulation based on the 
likely effects of “globalisation” and noting most views support global harmonisation. 
Section II will discuss specifically the UN Corruption Convention and compare the 
Convention (which aims at global harmonising of certain practices against corruption) 
against its ideals and a theoretical optimal regulation. Section III will discuss the 
influence of regulatory “clubs” (such as the OECD or OAS Corruption Conventions) 
and show how regional harmonisation may be superiour to global harmonisation in 
                                                 
1 Following Held at al. (2001), “international organisations” are taken to be inter-governmental 
organisations such as the United Nations, the OECD, or the WTO; in contrast with international NGOs 
or multi-national enterprises.  
2 The OECD has an unsuccessful example in the Multi-lateral Agreement on Investment (Rugman, 
2000).  
3 Gamble et al. (2003) discuss the effects of globalisation on international law and provide data on 
number of international treaties over the later part of the 20
th century.  





























Source: Data reported in Held et al. (2001)  3
terms of reaching an ideal and optimum. Section IV will address how global 
harmonisation may be deleterious to national interests and will discuss how such 
global harmonisation may be “domesticated” in the nations’ laws and moeurs. 
Because business practices depend on a wide range of influences in the national 
business system, attempts at harmonisation are at best “ambivalent”.  
Globalisation and Regulatory Harmonisation  
 
Most discussions of regulation begin by considering the reasons for regulation 
and the obstacles to regulation (Jacobs, 2002). At the international level, the 
consideration of such reasons and obstacles is tied to a discussion of “globalisation” 
(where globalisation is defined as increased amount of economic, political and social 
interaction across physical space). Discussions of the reasons for regulations are based 
upon a contingency view which sees regulation as the result of negative externalities -- 
often stemming from supposedly increased international economic inter-dependence -
- which international action can correct (Nicholaidis, 1997). Increases in capital and 
goods flows attendant with such globalisation are thus supposed to have required the 
creation of international “rules of the game” and the provision of international “public 
goods” mitigating the “public bads” generated by international capital flows, flows of 
resources between multi-national enterprises, tax avoidance, environmental 
degradation, and intellectual property right infringement among others (Jacobs, 2002). 
National regulation often can not address these concerns because of inefficiency, 
conflicts over the distribution of regulatory costs and benefits, macro-level instability, 
and security dilemmas (Eden and Hampson, 1997).   
 
The proper regulatory response, and particularly the decision for or against 
harmonisation, depends upon whether such globalisation promotes economic 
convergence, divergence, or ambivalence. Clearly, if economic structures and 
outcomes are converging, then a “one-size-fits-all” regulatory approach (namely 
harmonisation) is sufficient. If these structures and outcomes (and I will be specific 
about which “structures” and “outcomes” I am referring to momentarily) are 
diverging, than one type of regulation will not fit all types of economies. If these 
structures and outcomes are “ambivalent” (where some variables are converging and 
others diverging, or if definitions of “convergence” and “divergence” can not be 
established, than the regulatory environment is highly uncertain and probably highly 
specific. Table 1 presents some views about the nature of globalisation along with 
implications for global harmonisation. Most of the effects suggest that global 
harmonisation is the best policy response irrespective of the type of globalisation.  
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Figure 2: Stances on Globalisation and Regulatory Implications 
 
  Economic Convergence   Economic Divergence  Ambivalent 
Enterprise 
level logic 
Globalisation brings economic 















Globally harmonised regulation 
for globally harmonised 
standard business  
Global harmonisation 








Systemic logic  Globalisation represents US 
hegemony (Gilpin,  1987)  
No real globalisation, 










Global harmonisation set by 
hegemon 
Minimalist global 
harmonisation based on 




dictated by powerful 
MNEs 
  Regions will integrate into a 
system – even if it is 
“divergent” (Berger and Dore, 
1996; Hall and Soskice (2001). 
State as executive 
committee of the 
bourgoisie (Pilger, 2002). 




Loose global harmonisation 
encompassing divergence  
Global harmonisation 
based on interests of 
national capitalist classes 
Global 
harmonisation as 





Globalisation is the next stage 
of economic evolution – for 
better or worse (Friedman, 
2000; Greider, 2001).  
MNEs foster natural 
differentiation in the 
“world system” (Strange, 
1997). 
MNEs are another 
layer in multi-
layered governance 
(Held et al., 1999).  
Regulatory  
Rationale 
Global harmonisation as 










Source: author.    5
Authors who claim that globalisation is 
promoting global economic convergence cite data 
such as figure 3 showing increases in capital flows 
– particularly from developed to developing 
countries.
4 These authors assert that such 
convergence is due to global economies of scale 
(Dunning, 1992), the rise of global brands and 
marketing (Levitt, 1983) or the need for highly 
efficient firms to seek out new markets (Ohmae, 
1990; Doz et al., 2001). Looking more broadly at 
the national support for such firms, writers such 
Gilpin (1987) assert that many large international 
corporations are US companies by origin and their 
expansion has been seen as a form of US 
“hegemonic” commercial expansion. Other authors 
such as Berger and Dore (1996) and Hall and Soskice (2001) are less sure that global 
capital will reflect American capitalism, but will instead differentiate between Europe, 
Asia and North America. Convergence in this case refers to the convergence toward a 
functionally integrated yet differentiated world market place (much like differentiated 
organs make up the physical body). If regionalisation or the retreat of the state is 
occurring, it is a temporary phenomenon on the road to global markets and global 
forms of governance – for the better (Friedman, 2000) or for the worse (Grieder, 
1998).  
 
If multi-national corporate operations are causing economic convergence, 
international harmonisation is both necessary and best (optimal). If the McWorld view 
of globalisation, asserting that all markets around the global will be the same, then 
logically only one type of regulation will be necessary (Barber, 1995).  If the 
economic system is converging to low levels or levels of intolerable suffering, than 
international regulation will ensure such convergence is welfare enhancing and 
morally acceptable to prevent convergence at levels which “revive forms of human 
exploitation that characterised industry one hundred years ago” (Grieder, 1998).
5 Yet 
the terms of such harmonisation are open for negotiation (Jacobs, 1994).  
 
The rationale behind the assertion that economic convergence implies that 
international harmonisation is both necessary and best (optimal can be seen from 
simple logic. The set of all possible “states of the world” -- for example income – can 
be defined as the set Y with elements y(j) where j refers to a particular country index. 
The regulatory regime can be denoted as R with elements r(j), again where j refers to 
a particular country index. Given the set Y and R, a unique relation can be drawn such 
that Y → R and for each element y(j) → r(j) for all countries (j). It therefore follows 
that if each element y(j) convergences to some y°, then each r(j) must also converge 
                                                 
4 Griffith-Jones and Leape (2002) note however that new capital flows are roughly the same now as at 
the start of the decade. 
5 A non-obvious implication of this line of reasoning is that liberalisation rather than harmonisation 
would be the best response if globalisation, independently of government regulation, provides the most 
efficient regulatory programmes. For example, globalisation may provide salaries to the poor-but-
talented and can influence governments in developing countries to accept certain policies – some oft-
cited examples being increased transparency of East Asian monetary and fiscal policy and the eventual 
end of apartheid in South Africa. Thus, international harmonisation would occur spontaneously rather 
than as a result of direct intervention by international institutions.    6
Figure 4: Global Diffusion of Pension Systems
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to some r° for all countries (j). Moreover, it is logical to suppose that such a 
regulatory regime r° would be designed in such a way that would maximise y. Such 
an optimal regulatory regime may be signified as r* and could pragmatically be set at 
a level to maximise Yt+1 in the equation  Yt+1 = R*(Yt).  
 
Another view of globalisation 
insists that globalisation can promote 
national and international economic 
divergence (rather than convergence), 
especially due to worker exploitation or 
inefficient redistribution of income 
through multi-national (MNE) global 
outsourcing strategies which offer low 
salaries to workers in developing 
countries (Klein, 2000). In a less 
nefarious form of divergence, no real 
globalisation occurs and most business and economic decisions are taken at the 
regional level (Hirst and Graham, 2001). According to this “regionalisation” view, 
economies share certain structure features which require co-ordinated fiscal and 
monetary policy which may be at variance between structurally different regions. 
Such difference could occur due either to natural structural differences between 
regions or due to “implementation lags” in policy lesson diffusion. Figure 4 shows the 
policy diffusion process for pension system reform for a number of countries over the 
period 1880 to 1990. As shown, there were three leading adopters (Germany, 
Denmark and New Zealand) in the late 1800s, with other countries adopting (roughly) 
according to the classical bell distribution – lagging countries were countries such as 
the Gambia and Peru in the late 1980s.  
 
If multi-national corporate operations are causing economic divergence, the 
implication appears again to militate for global harmonisation -- as international 
regulation is necessary to restrain deleterious economic competition, redress wrongs 
committed by MNEs and promote an ethic of fair trade. In the case of divergences 
stemming from “unfair” outsourcing arrangements, harmonisation is required to 
guarantee a minimum standard and help efficiently redistribute income which 
powerful market actors have taken from less powerful ones.
6 If such divergence is 
caused by regionalisation, than harmonisation would be based on regional 
compromise or bargaining power (as will be discussed below).   
 
The rationale behind the assertion that economic divergence would still 
militate for international harmonisation can be seen using the logic previous 
described. For the sets Y and R, each element y(j) → r(j) and by the definition of 
divergence, no two elements can be equal. Yet, some y(j) or “states of the world” will 
clearly be better than others (irrgardless of how “better” is defined). Thus, if there 
exists some y*, then it follows that r* must also exist such that r* is “better” than r(j) 
over a set-set of r(j). 
  
Finally there is a third school which argues against convergence or divergence, 
but instead notes the changing or “ambivalent” power of globalisation. According to 
                                                 
6 The case of such redistribution in promoting the stability of the system has been made by Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2000) and Benabou and Ok (2001) among others.   7
Held et al. (1999), “globalisation is an idea whose time has come...yet, it 
[globalisation] lacks precise definition” (p.1). Despite the imprecision of the term 
“globalisation,” the use of the term, according to Held et al. reflects increased inter-
connectedness in political, economic and cultural matters across the world creating a 
“shared social space” (ibid.) Given this inter-connectedness, globalisation may be 
defined as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the 
spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental 
or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power” (ibid., p. 16). 
Such processes produce variegated responses, some positive and others negative in a 
complex “multi-layered” form of governance. There are several specific examples of 
such ambivalence. Large MNEs are not single consolidated entities and hegemonic 
organisations, but can often represent alliances or networks based on similar business 
interests. MNEs may focus clusters of groups with international organisations or other 
international enterprises which concentrate economic and political power (Braithwaite 
and Drahos, 2000). If these groups are able to exercise significant political power, 
such a trend would represent a multi-layered governance structure “’re-engineering’ 
the power, functions and authority of national governments” (Held et al. 1991, p. 8). 
Such ambivalence is also reflected in “glocalisation” thinking which stresses the 
incorporation of global goods, capital, labour and ideas into local institutions 
(Pieterse, 2001).  
 
Each view of globalisation has different implications for international 
regulatory harmonisation. If the world is converging toward homogeneity in social, 
economic and political structures, than a “one-size-fits-all” type international 
regulatory structure may be optimal. Without convergence, given both the positive 
and negative aspects of globalisation, “one-size-fits-all” regulation would be clearly 
inappropriate as harmonisation would over-regulate in certain cases and under-
regulate in others. Global harmonisation would set incentives for organisational 
strategy which may be sub-optimal. Worse, global harmonisation may be dictated by 
powerful MNEs -- thus, regulation must occur at the decentralised level -- often on a 
case-by-case level.  
 
The rationale behind the assertion that an ambivalent globalisation would led 
to no fixed view of regulatory regime can be seen using the logic previous described. 
For the sets Y and R, each element y(j) → r(j). Yet, by the definition of ambivalence, 
r(j) may be non-unique for various elements of j. If there is an optimal r*, than such 
an optimal may apply to more than one r(j). Indeed, by the definition of ambivalence, 
the nature of the relationship between y(j) and r(j) may be “loose” in the sense that no 
direct relationship may apply or that the definition of r may be ambiguous.    8
 
This discussion is summarised in 
Figure 5 which shows the implications 
for regulation based on different types of 
globalisation. If the state of the world 
for all countries j is converging to one 
level y*, then r converges to r* and 
international institutions need to make 
sure harmonisation efforts aim at r* (if 
globalisation does not take care of it 
itself). In the case of divergence, each 
element of Y approaches a unique and 
non-indentical yj for all j. Because some 
y are better than others, and specifically y* is the best of them all, then r(j) should be 
set by an external power (such as an international institution) such that r(j) = r* for all 
j. If globalisation is ambiguous, then no one-to-one relation between the nature of 
globalisation and the regulatory regime can be established and “anything goes.” 
International regulation needs to be broad enough to allow for fact that r* is no longer 
unique.  
 
If all areas of regulation are subject to these three tendencies, than a discussion 
about one particular type of regulation can shed light on regulation more generally. If 
R is the set of all possible regulations for all countries and Rac is a sub-set of R (where 
the sub-script ac refers to anti-corruption), than what is true for Rac could well be true 
for R. International regulatory harmonisation of individual country j regulations 
forbidding bribe payments to public officials represents one type of such regulation. 
The harmonisation of regulations governing executive agencies responsible for 
handling payments or making public sector regulation reflects another specific 
instance of such regulation. These regulations more generally are referred to as anti-
corruption regulations or regulations against corruption.  
 
The factors which influence such anti-corruption regulation can shed light on 
the discussion of international regulatory harmonisation more broadly. If the state of 
the world Y is converging, than a universal harmonisation of regulations – led by the 
United National -- against corruption would be best (R*). Such a presupposition is 
clearly guiding regulatory convergence on other standards such as accounting 
standards (Sylwia Gornik-Tomaszewski et al., 2003). If there is divergence, than a 
UN Convention would either be vital (if they can find and enforce the optimal r*) or it 
would be sub-optimal and countries should pursue either regional initiatives (such as 
the OECD Convention on Bribery, or the OAS Convention) or engage in unilateral 
action.
7 If globalisation is ambivalent, than “anything goes” and a UN Convention 
would have little real impact because it would be interpreted or re-interpreted 
according to individual countries needs.  
 
 
                                                 
7 See Richardson (2001) for an overview of corruption treaties. 
Figure 5: Implications of 
Globalisation on Harmonisation
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Regulatory Responses and Pressures for Harmonisation: The UN 
Convention Against Corruption 
 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption represents an example of 
global harmonisation led by an international institution. The Convention, successfully 
negotiated in October 2003 (and adopted in early November), was the result of two 
years of negotiation by 130 governments participating in the Convention – starting 
with the "Vienna Declaration” issued at the Tenth UN Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in April 2000. The Vienna Declaration resulted 
in the United Nations General Assembly adoption of resolution 55/61 in December 
2000, requesting the analytic reports necessary for a Convention and resolution 
55/188 of the same year proposing the establishment of a group of experts on 
international illegal corruption-related cash flows. The following spring, another 




The Convention mainly aims at improving accounting standards, preventing 
money laundering, reducing bank secrecy, aiming at the return of illegally obtained 
assets, and promoting co-operation between the private sector and government 
authorities. Specifically on international business, the Convention urges member 
states:  
 
“to prevent corruption involving the private sector through measures that 
focus, inter alia, on: (a) Promoting cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies and relevant private entities; and (b) Promoting the development of 
standards and procedures designed to safeguard the integrity of relevant 
private entities, including codes of conduct for the correct, honourable and 
proper performance of the activities of business and all relevant professions 
and the prevention of conflicts of interest” (UN, 2003; article 11).  
 
In this case, the text is relatively ambiguous. What type of cooperation is 
being sought and how would such cooperation be implemented in practice? Other 
equally ambiguous statements are found elsewhere in the Convention such as in 
articles calling for the establishment of an adequate supervisory framework for 
financial institutions, promotion of transparency among private entities, prevention of 
the misuse of public procedures regulating private entities, and the prevention of 
conflicts of interest. Yet, in other cases, the measures are concrete such as article 2, 
noting that “each State Party shall deny the tax deductibility of expenses that 
constitute bribes” and “each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally in the course of business activity.”  
 
                                                 
8 For some antecedents, see UN Declaration on Corruption and Bribery in International Business 
Transaction (General Assembly A/Res/51/191 passed on December 16, 1996, UN Resolution on 
International Code of Conduct for Public Officials (General Assembly A/Res/51/59), UN Resolution 
on International Cooperation Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions 
(GA A/Res/52/87) passed on December 12, 1997, and the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, passed on November 15, 2000.   10




















































In any contract, “rational ambiguity” could be the result of contracting parties’ 
desire for flexibility in the face of non-contractual elements, unexpected changes in 
the state of the world, contracting costs, and other factors (Salanie, 1997; Eggertsson, 
1990). Ambiguity could also recognise the evolutionary aspect of regulation, that 
“optimal” regulation requires learning and that a variety of different regulatory 
approaches could provide the variation needed to assess which approach results in 
more desired outcomes (Nelson, 1995; Rapaczynski, 1996).  Completely defined 
contracts are too rigid whereas completely ambiguous contracts offer little value over 
an ill-defined status quo. As such, there is probably some useful degree of ambiguity.  
 
  The degree of ambiguity of a set of regulation R can be defined for each 
article i in regulation r(j) as a(i). Such ambiguity can be quantitatively bounded 
between two arbitrary measures p <a < q where p is the minimum of the scale and q is 
the maximum for each article. As a approaches p, such regulation can be described as 
“loose” whereas as a approaches q, such regulation could be described as “tight” or 
“binding”. For a scale where p=1 and q=5, this ambiguity can be plotted as shown in 
Figure 6. In Figure 6, each article of the UN Convention Against Corruption was 
analysed based on its specificity. A score of 1 indicates the article refers to a broad 
principle. A score of 2 indicates that the article refers to a particular mandate and a 
general direction for fulfilling the mandate. A score of 3 notes that the article outlines 
a mandate in detail and suggests broad mechanisms for fulfilling the mandate. A score 
of 4 is given for articles that define reasonably detailed requirements and provide 
specific instructions for compliance. A score of 5 is given for articles that provide a 
relatively (for international treaties!) concrete, specific and well-defined obligations 
and actions needed to fulfill the obligation.  
 
As shown in Figure 6, there is wide variation in the clarity of articles in the 
UN Convention. Such variation reflects, in part, “non-divisibility” problems of taking 
a coherent and logically consistent document and breaking it into parts. Any 
Convention must define the principles which guide it and provide specific measures 
for addressing those principles. Such an interpretation would imply, however, a 
pattern of clarity and ambiguity in the data – with introductory articles establishing 
broad principles and later articles establishing concrete measures for every sub-  11






















































section of the Convention (the convention is divided into a number of sections). Yet, 
as shown in Figure 6, no such pattern seems present.  
 
In other cases, the Convention appears to address issues only marginally 
associated with corruption -- such as accounting standards (Article 12), prohibiting 
the establishment of off-the-books accounts, inadequately identified transactions, 
recording of non-existent expenditure, or the use of false documents (among others). 
Money laundering is another area with important yet indirect effects on corruption 
and the Convention requires (in Article 33) the criminalization of money-laundering 
of proceeds of corruption, in Article 58 prohibitions against invoking bank secrecy as 
a ground for refusal of international mutual assistance and in Article 61 and 62 
promotes the recovery of assets.  
 
The degree of relevance of a set of regulations R can be defined for each 
article i in regulation r(j) as q(i). Such relevance can be bounded between two 
arbitrary measures t <q < u where t is the minimum of the scale and u is the 
maximum. For a scale where t=1 and u=5, this relevance can be plotted as shown in 
Figure 7. In Figure 7, each article of the Convention was analysed based on its 
relevance to anti-corruption. A score of 1 indicates the article is not related to fighting 
corruption. A score of 2 refers to an article which is related to corruption but only 
tangentially. For example, articles promoting criminal co-operation are related to 
corruption but would probably be better placed in a treaty on criminal co-operation. A 
score of 3 indicates the proposed measure is often one component of a “standard” 
anti-corruption programme but the article does not directly discuss anti-corruption. A 
score of 4 indicates the article is directly related to anti-corruption, but the article is 
vague. A score of 5 indicates the article is directly related to anti-corruption.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 7, many of the articles appear only tangentially related to 
corruption, possibly reflecting Braithwaite and Drahos’s (2000) “agenda shifting.” In 
other words, the proponents of the UN Convention (such as the United States) may 
have been interested in passing international regulation on improving accounting 
standards, preventing money laundering, reducing bank secrecy, aiming at the return 
of illegally obtained assets, and promoting co-operation between the private sector   12
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and government (especially in a post-September 11
th environment). Given the current 
global policy environment which views corruption as particularly harmful, these 
tangential issues may have been easier to pass under a “corruption” banner than under 
conventions on accounting standards or money laundering.   
 
If the ambiguity and relevance of the articles of the Corruption Convention are 
analysed together, some indication is given of the total article “distance” from some 
optimum or normative aspect heralded by the Convention. If i’ represents the ideal 
article or the content of the article claimed by the proponents of the Convention, and d 
is the actual distance from that ideal (where d in this case is the arithmetic average of  
a and q), than d can be portrayed as shown in Figure 8. As can be seen, from the 
figure, the articles in the Convention have different differences from an admittedly ill-
defined “ideal”.
9 Looking at the articles as a whole, it would appear that the UN 
Convention does not achieve the ideal to which it aspired.   
 
 
  Yet, the “ideal” regulation and the “optimum” regulation may not be 
equivalent. If i’ represents the “ideal” article as previously discussed in regulation r’ 
(which is comprised entirely of ideal articles i’) and i* represents the optimal article in 
regulation r* (also entirely composed of optimal articles r*), than it is possible that 
ralso as previously discussed, it is possible that r(j) ≠ r’(j)≠ r*(j) for a regulation in 
country j. Indeed, an optimum international 
regulation would allow for variety and 
diversity and make provision for national 
institutions. For example, Figure 9 shows 
regional differences in national rule of law. 
As can be seen, regions such as the Former 
Soviet Union have relatively little rule of 
law – thus little capacity to implement 
globally harmonised regulation. The ideal 
regulation r’ for the sub-set of countries j 
which comprises the former Soviet Union 
may not be the same as for the OECD countries. However, the optimum regulation r* 
might take ability to implement into account. Such optimal regulation might also take 
                                                 
9 Figure 8 has been plotted with negative distances to portray zero as an ideal “asymptote.”     13
into account the corruption promoting effects of increased regulation in an 
environment of low administrative capacity. In other words, anti-corruption regulation 
may create the administrative barriers civil servants can use to extract bribes!  
 
The optimal regulation in some cases may be very “tight” (high value of a) 
and in other cases “loose” (low value of a) because generally international 
standardisation and harmonisation have a number of draw-backs which should 
discourage international institutions from attempting too “tight” harmonisation 
(Nicholaides, 1997). Standardisation may serve to discourage innovation and reduce 
choice. Often the discussion revolves around more high profile sectors such as mobile 
telephony, computing and service sectors. However, the same principles are 
applicable to anti-corruption regulation. If standards favour one set of regulations at 
the expense of others, standards may actually increase corruption for some countries 
(by creating more administrative barriers).  
 
As shown in the case of the global trading system, the establishment of 
common frameworks could be unfair to developing countries or particular countries. 
In the case of free trade, instead of an most favoured nation framework, the WTO 
may wish to ensure transparency, pluri-lateral managed mutual recognition, a globally 
decentralised framework, and promote regulation in weak countries. In the case of 
anti-corruption regulation, forcing developing countries to adopt standards which the 
developed countries did not have to comply with during their phase of development 
could be seen as putting them at a competitive disadvantage.  
 
Countries should pursue regulatory strategies which serve the country’s 
objectives and goals rather than simply adopt harmonisation (Jacobs, 1994). Among 
these strategies include negotiated strategies, co-operative strategies (designed with 
other countries before, during, or after implementation), delegated strategies (to 
supra-national or sub-national entities), and “semi-government” regulation relying on 
industry self-regulation and international standards organisations. Moreover, 
preferences underlying regulation may differ according to country or region. For 
example, the US prefers a federal system of regulation while the UK prefers a 
deregulated system (Tate, 2001). Finally, there is an implicit assumption in the 
literature that global harmonisation is the solution to problem of public goods. As the 
experience of the creation and regulation of public goods at the national level 
demonstrates, they are notoriously difficult to influence either due to co-ordination 
failures, free riding, “tragedy of the commons”-type problems or incomplete 
information. In the case of anti-corruption regulations, the developed countries see the 
UN Convention as a public good which reduces drafting costs of developing 
countries.  
 
Ideal regulation, optimal regulation and actual regulation are three different 
concepts. In order to clarify some of the issues involved, Figure 10 presents a 2x2 
matrix exploring the possible convergences and divergences between ideal, optimal 
and actual regulation. In this matrix, two relationships are considered: whether the 
actual level of regulation is tighter or looser than the ideal and whether the ideal is 
tighter or looser than the optimum. If the ideal regulation is tighter than the optimum, 
than this represents a “Panglossian world” because the goal being strived for exceeds 
the optimal – the country wants more regulation than is beneficial. If the ideal 
regulation is looser than the optimum, than this is a “Machiavellian world” because   14
the optimal exceeds the ideal – and the country needs more regulation than it defines 
as its ideal. In a normative sense, if the actual amount of regulation is greater than the 
ideal, then there is nominal over-regulation (and nominal under-regulation if the 
actual amount of regulation is less than the ideal).  I use the ideal level of regulation 
as the “pivot” between these two relationships in order to ground the discussion 
around the UN Convention.  
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Four possible regulatory regimes can be sketched out. If the actual level of 
regulation is tighter than the ideal, and the ideal is tighter than the optimal, than this is 
clearly over-regulation by all standards – thus it is effective over-regulation. If the 
actual level of regulation is looser than the ideal, and the ideal is looser than the 
optimal, then there is clearly under-regulation by all standards – thus it is effective 
under-regulation. Along the trace of the matrix, the choices are clear. However, in 
quandrants I and III, the choices are not so clear because regulation can fall 
somewhere between the ideal and the optimum. For example, an optimal amount of 
regulation may be greater than an ideal (if completely control of corruption is the a 
priori “best” regulatory arrangement (where “best” is defined along some measure).  
 
In cases of uncertainty, countries may wish to follow a regional approach or 
follow unilateralism – as this would allow them to define their own ideal as closely as 
possible to their optimum level of regulatory “tightness.” The OECD convention 
against bribery - which has been ratified by 35 countries is one example as is the Draft 
African Union convention on preventing and combating corruption - adopted by 
African presidents in Maputo, Mozambique on July 2003. The Council of Europe’s 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption has had 14 countries ratify this legally-
binding instrument. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption has been 
ratified by 22 OAS states since March 1997. 
   15
  If these “clubs” can define 
their r close to r’ such that effectively 
r=r’, then the goal of regional Anti-
Corruption Convention builders might 
not be to set the degree of “tightness” 
as close as possible to the optimal (r*). 
The regulator’s problem is 
summmarised in Figure 11. The Figure 
shows the costs to regulating away 
from the optimum as a quadratic 
function. The gains come from the 
benefits of “loose” regulation 
previously discussed, namely the gain from variety and experimentation. In the graph, 
three regulatory regimes are shown. Previously, I left the nature of regulation between 
states of the world and regulatory outcomes vague, suggesting simply that Y → R. If 
the efficiency of the regulation regime is taken into account, then the overall benefits 
of regulation may rise or fall for each level of tightness or looseness. In other words, 
the gains to freedom curve may shift depending on the structure nature of the 
regulatory regime – reflecting for example the degree of learning in a regulatory 
regime.  
 
Regulatory efficiency reflects the total rather than relative costs and benefits 
of the regulatory regime. In other words, the position of the gains from freedom curve 
reflects some notion of the “scale” of the regulatory regime. Line A shows large scale 
but highly effective regulatory structure which generates large benefits. It also 
generates high levels of costs in equilibrium -- intersecting the cost curve at a level of 
regulation well in excess of the optimal.
10 In this “scaled up” regulatory structure, 
both costs and benefits are high. The second curve portrays a regulatory structure 
where the gains curve intersects the cost curve at its lowest point, namely at the 
optimum level of regulation. In this regulatory structure however both the costs and 
benefits are low. By scaling down the regulatory structure even further (as shown by 
line C), it is possible to find a structure which finds a middle ground – offering 
moderate costs and benefits and balancing divergence from the optimum. Intuitively, 
regulation should be even looser than the short-run state-of-the-world maximising 
level in order to capture gains from learning and regulatory diversity.  
 
  This analysis suggests two possibilities for the UN Convention. First, the 
convention should be “loose” enough to allow for variety, even if it seems sub-
optimal. The ambiguity in the Convention suggests some of this looseness. Second, 
regulation can be made “tight” but only for a smaller range of countries with a closer 
degree of convergence on their states of the world (Y). Depending on the variable 
values, a world of tightly regulations “clubs” may be better than a world of globally 
harmonised, but loosely defined regulation.  
                                                 
10 In theory, there could be multiple equilibria, as line A for example should also intersect the cost 
curve at a very low level of regulation at a very high level of costs and benefits. This equilibrium can 
be precluded by assuming that such low levels of regulation would not be a large departure from status 
quo. Thus, each of the freedom gain lines starts at modest levels of regulation.  
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Source: Dasgupta, Roy and Wheeler (1995)
Harmonisation Effects of “Clubs”  
 
Should international institutions 
promote regulatory harmonisation at 
the “club” rather than global level? As 
Figure 12 shows, there is strong 
evidence to support the view that Y→ 
R or that regulation is a function of 
states of the world. The simplest 
measure of these states of the world is 
income. As the Figure shows, higher 
income countries tend to have more 
regulation. There are two possible 
explanations. First, these countries are relatively structurally similar, thus they require 
similar levels of regulation. Such an interpretation would be a contingency theory 
type view. Second, such regulation could be the result of the policy diffusion 
previously discussed. Similar clubs have a tendency to form epistemic communities 
and have more links via trade in goods, services, ideas, capital and labour.
11 Thus, 
increased regulation occurs and harmonisation at the club level seems likely.
12 
Despite claims to the contrary, such clubs do not necessarily represent a phase in a 
teleological evolution toward a globally harmonised regime under the tutelage of 
international organisations (Eden and Hampson, 1996). Such clubs may be 
dynamically “stable” so the OECD and OAS Conventions may not quickly be 
replaced by the UN Convention. The “optimal size” of such clubs might depend on 
the bargaining costs related to the creation of the regulatory regime and other factors 
(ibid). Given the stability of these regional groupings, there is little role for global 
business harmonisation by international organisations – as evidenced by the varying 
standards of the EU (a mix of national regulations), USA (hyper-liberal) and Asia 
(different national regulations).  
 
The other way to approach the question of clubs is given by Eden and Hapson 
(1996), who note that such “clubs” form depending on the type of public good to be 
produced or regulated. These goods vary according to their degree of rivalry (or the 
degree that joint effort must be taken) and excludability. For example, private goods 
such as industrial goods or services would be examples of rival and non-excludable 
goods. Atomic energy regulation or tariffs on international trade would be examples 
of non-rival but excludable goods. International institutions would have little role to 
play in harmonisation because each type of good requires a different type of 
regulation. The case of international regulation by international institutions is further 
weakened given the role that firms play in self-regulation of “club goods” (Eden and 
Hampson, 1996). Goods like oil or autos are both controlled by firms and 
governments. Goods such as tin or illegal drugs are heavily controlled by firms and 
unregulated at the international level. In each of these cases, regulation by 
international organisations is contingent on the degree of regulation by business and 
no particular force for harmonisation is to be found.  
 
                                                 
11 See Haus (1992) for a discussion of epistemic communities.  
12 Thomas (1980) discusses policy convergence among political parties in the West and finds using an 
index of policy scores support for such convergence.    17




























Figure 13 shows the Eden and 
Hampson analysis with the anti-corruption 
treaties previous discussed super-imposed 
on their original diagram. As can been 
seen, each Convention presses for a new 
division of regulation between national 
government and international government 
on the one hand, and national and 
international business on the other hand. 
In the case of the UN (2003) convention, 
the aim is to raise the “regulatory 
minimum” from a relatively low level of regulation (especially in developing 
countries) by both the public sector and the private sector. The private sector plays a 
role as defined in articles 11 and 12 of the UN Convention. For the Organisation of 
American States (1996) Convention, there also minimum standards for a 
geographically more focused area and there is less reliance on the private sector. The 
Asian Development Bank-OECD (2001) initiative on corruption, while non-binding, 
potentially extends greatly the power of government to work across borders over a 
wide range of issues as defined in their action plan. Interestingly, the OECD (1998) 
Convention and the ICC rules (1999) are work in opposite directions with business 
claiming the right of self-regulation. Indeed, business has been fighting back as the 
chairman of the ICC (2003) “experts” worry that the Convention could create “an 
uneven playing field for business”.    
National regulation 
 
Perhaps the causality between Y 
and R is reversed, namely that R → Y. 
In this view, regulation plays a key role 
in deciding the realisation of the state-of-
the-world. While regulation in other 
areas besides anti-corruption has 
probably played an important role in 
changing Y, in the case of anti-
corruption, such reverse causality does 
not appear likely (yet). Even at the 
“club” level, the empirical evidence 
suggests that regulatory harmonisation 
(R) is not leading the harmonisation of outcomes (Y). For example, in the EU, despite 
the creation and adoption of similar policies, there are still important differgences 
between acquis commautaire countries in terms of their corruption levels (see figure 
14). On the Transparency International scale where 10 is perfectly transparency and 1 
is non-transparent, some leading countries like Finland are several points away from 
others like France. Such divergences in outcomes suggest implementation remains an 
important issue.
13 Different national networks and regulatory frameworks still remain 
relatively unchanged and national standards institutions still differ and still operate. 
                                                 
13 Such divergences also support the “ambivalent” view of globalisation as it was defined previously 
given the non-unique correspondence of several y(j) to one r (assuming these r have in fact changed in 
















Adopted from: Eden and Hampson (1997)
Figure 13: International Governance Structures  18





































Such divergence suggests that policymaking is strategic and locally-based – leaving 
little room for international organisations to harmonise international business 
practices.  
 
Such trends are also visible by 
comparing such ranking with the time 
since the coming into force of the OECD 
(2003) Anti-Bribery Convention 
implementing legislation. In theory, there 
would either be a positive or negative 
correlation. A positive correlation would 
exist if corruption acted as pressure for a 
government to adopt the Convention. A 
negative correlation would exist if the 
Convention was effective and promptly 
helped reduce corruption. No relation 
however, would suggest that such regulatory harmonisation had little impact on 
corruption. As shown in Figure 15, there appears to be no relation between time since 
the adoption of the Convention and Transparency International rating. In some cases 
such as in the Slovak Republic, the TI ranking remains low despite a relatively long 
time since ratification while Turkey maintains a similar TI rating despite more recent 
membership.  
 
Why might there be no strong relationship between regulation and outcomes? 
According to authors such as Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997), the regulatory regime 
should maximise the international competitiveness of the country’s firms. For Hall 
and Soskice (2001), international competitive advantage is derived from the “national 
business system” and regulation will only be adopted by a country to the extent that it 
improves international competitive advantage of the national business system. In their 
model, the national business system consists of four elements: intra-firm relations 
(industrial relations), inter-firm relations, markets for human capital formation and 
education, and financial capital markets.
 Regulation must either support the functional 
integration of the national business system at the national level or a country’s 
competitive advantage at the international level. 
 
To maximise outcomes, regulation must “fit” in the national business system. 
In this rather functionalist model, if regulation brings any element of the business 
system out of alignment with the other elements of the business system, then it is sub-
optimal regulation. Anti-corruption regulation may, in the same way, reduce the 
efficiency of already inefficient national business systems. Figure 16 shows some 
ways that corruption can help promote output growth in corruption-ridden developing 
economies for each component of the national business system. In an argument 
redolent of the shock therapy versus gradualism argument from the transition 
literature, the global optimum would be to reconfigure the business system without 
corruption. But if only partial reform is possible, it may forestall the latent (rather than 
manifest) benefits of corruption – thus moving regulatory away from its local 
optimum. For example, in the case of labour markets, corruption may allow 
individuals to obtain training that would be rationed if queues were too long. Data 
from Latvia is also presented to give a rough indication of the scale of corruption in 
each sector. As can be seen, corruption is relatively high in all sectors. In the case of   19
corruption prone economies, the optimal “tightness” of regulation may be much 
looser in the short run than a global Convention may find ideal. 
 
Figure 16: Effect of Corruption in Corruption-Prone Countries 
 
 Benefit Data  for  Latvia 
Training/ 
Labour markets 
Generates funds to keep 
teachers in jobs and funds state 





Allows for informal allocation 
of scare capital  
52% 
Inter-firm rivalry  Promotes “co-operation” via 
joint participation in corruption 
53% 
Industrial relations  Promotes “co-operation” via 
joint participation in corruption 
* 
Source: World Bank (2003).  
 
If regulation does affect national business system “fit”, than given important 
differences in regulatory preferences between countries, there would be little political 
will inside the international organisations to promote the harmonisation of global 
business practices (Tate, 2001). Within the Anglo-American “liberal” business 
system, standards are treated as products of a free market. Market actors define their 
own standards and market actors are left to determine which standards – sometimes 
from a variety of competing standards -- to adopt. Even within the “liberal” Anglo-US 
model, there are divergences as the US system of standards leaves much regulatory 
discretion to the individual states whereas in Britain, regulation is handled on a 
national level. Co-ordinated economies such as Germany and Japan tend to favour 
code-based regulation which extends on existing structures and acts as 
“infrastructure” rather than as a product of market transactions. Given the diverging 
nature of regulation between these types of economies, liberal economies would 
prefer a liberal global extension of regulation whereas co-ordinated economies would 
adopt an international approach – noting the specificity of regulation to the type of 
economic co-ordination. In the corruption prone economies, there may be little 
interest in regulatory harmonisation due to the short-term harms which would ensue.
14  
 
The discussion of national business systems suggests that the effect of 
international organisations in promoting harmonisation depends on the ways a country 
“internalises” regulation (Teubner, 2001). Regulatory “convergence” is determined by 
domestic political interests which push for or against convergence (such as American 
“gaiatsu” or pressure which worked with domestic interests in Japan toward trade 
liberalisation)! While a comparativist perspective would see such success as the result 
of institutional balances of power (such as the autonomy of legal class), a culturalist 
perspective stresses the law’s fit with society’s episteme. Teubner (2001) looks at the 
implementation of the legal principle of “good faith” in Germany and the UK. In 
Germany, a “good faith” principle can facilitate trust while in UK it can promote 
opportunistic behaviour. As such, regulation can act more as a legal “irritant” if it 
does not fit within the “body of law” or episteme. Thus, any attempt at harmonisation 
                                                 
14 Of relevance is Khanna and Palepu (1999) which finds that deregulation may promote business 
group bonding (the extent to which this pattern works in reverse is still uncertain).    20
would not lead to convergence, but to fragmentation and contestation. Thus, the exact 
same regulation applied to two different cases may be “ambivalent” in its effects.  
 
  In some cases, such “ambivalence” could be due to the balance of political 
interests within the country. In Michael (2004), I argued that the decision to adopt 
anti-corruption regulation depends on the basic trade-off in outcomes versus 
redistribution. The policymaker will need to adopt some anti-corruption regulation in 
order to preserve the legitimacy of the government as well as guarantee some 
minimum level of functionality. However, as a self-interested profit maximiser, the 
policymaker will not wish to adopt regulations which drastically reduce current 
financial returns from corruption. In the paper, I sketched out a model where 
regulation promotes the legitimacy of the government but reduces returns to the 
policymakers. The policy problem for the policymakers is than to adopt anti-
corruption relation to the point which maximises his or her private gains.    
Conclusion 
 
Should international institutions promulgate global and harmonised 
regulation? Many views of globalisation suggest that international regulatory 
harmonisation toward some regulatory ideal is desirable. Yet, as the UN Convention 
Against Corruption shows, such harmonisation based on a regulatory ideal may be 
undesirable or at least sub-optimal. International regulation often comes to grips with 
this sub-optimality, either deliberately or accidentally, through loosely defined 
harmonised standards. In other cases, it comes to grips with this sub-optimality 
through the formation of “clubs” which take a tighter view of regulation in exchange 
for membership with more aligned structural features. Given that countries often 
adapt such harmonised regulations to their national business system, such global 
harmonisation as emboddied in the UN Convention, may not really matter much 
anyway. Should the UN have expended so many resources working on the 
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